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Abstract— Enterprise password policies require the use 
of complex passwords that contain lowercase and 
uppercase letters, numbers and symbols. Considering this 
common requirement, end-users tend to create complex (!) 
passwords containing certain patterns which make such 
passwords guessable and therefore insecure. Replacement 
pattern is one of these pattern-types and substitutes a 
number or symbol for a certain letter. As an example, the 
letter ”o” is replaced with 0 (zero) and password becomes 
passw0rd. Even though passw0rd contains a number and 
is assumed a strong password, its replacement pattern can 
be misused to guess it successfully and crack it easily. In 
our research, In our re-search, we performed an 
automated analysis of 1.330.780 word list from different 
languages to identify possible replacement patterns This 
list contains words form the dictionaries of the most used 
languages (only the ones that uses Latin script) in the 
world. We identified 43 different replacement-types for 
one character replacements (single type replacement), 9 
different replacement-types for two character 
replacements (dual type replacement) and 15 different 
replacement-types for three character replacements (triad 
type replacement) for our analysis. These identified 
replacement patterns can be utilized to improve 
dictionary-attacks, especially for forensic investigations. In 
this paper, we explain our methodology to identify 
replacement patterns. The main purpose of this article is 
to show that with replacement methods on plain texts, it is 
possible to have more successful rates when trying to 
recovering hashed passwords. 
Index Terms—Password security, hash cracking, 
replacement patterns.  
I. MOTIVATION 
Authentication is one of the most important 
information security requirements and passwords 
are the most frequently used method for 
authentication due to its easy integration. But the 
security of passwords has always become and also 
will become a big headache for end-users, 
application developers, system administrators as 
well as security experts since black-hat hackers 
target primarily leakage of passwords [1, 2, 3, 4].  
 
Passwords should be complex against guessing 
attacks. This requires that they should contain 
uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and 
symbols. Moreover, minimum password length 
should be 8 characters for today. But people as end-
users, system administrators, etc. are bad at 
remembering complex passwords. It is also 
suggested that different passwords should be used 
for different server accounts and applications. This 
makes password security more problematic, even 
impossible to accomplish. 
 
When people are forced to use complex 
passwords, they tend to choose passwords which 
fulfill complexity rules of policies whereas their 
chosen passwords are not secure against guessing 
attacks. As an example”Passw0rd.” can be given. It 
contains an uppercase letter, lowercase letters, a 
number and a symbol. Even though it satisfies 
complexity rules according to the general 
complexity rules, it can be easily cracked by 
exploiting the patterns used. This password contains 
Capitalization pattern (i.e. p !P), Replacement 
pattern (i.e. o !0) as well as Appending pattern (i.e. 
a dot is appended). 
 
In our research, we created plain text word list 
from variety of vocabularies. Then we applied 
different types of replacements to these words. For 
more accurate results, duplicated words were 
eliminated. We wrote a Python code for the 
replacements and eliminating duplicated results. 
Finally, we compared the result with and without 
replacements for recovering hashed passwords. 
Based on the results of our analysis, we identified 
67 different replacement types. They can be utilized 
for example to enhance dictionary attacks. 
Especially, forensic investigators may need to 
bypass authentication for further analysis and they 
can benefit from our identified replacement 
patterns. In this paper, we explain our analysis 
methodology, our results in detail. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses the related works. Our analysis of 
replacement patterns is explained in Section 3 in 
detail. The results of our analysis are evaluated in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
discusses the future work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The first complexity analysis of RockYou 
passwords was conducted by Imperva[5] They 
focused only on complexity rather than patterns. 
According to their analysis, 60% of the RockYou 
passwords contain only lowercase letters, uppercase 
letters or numeric values and therefore very 
insecure. About 30% of the RockYou passwords 
have the length which is equal to or below six 
characters. The list of the most frequently used Top 
20 passwords is given in the analysis as well. The 
most frequently used password is”123456”. 
 
Veras et al.[6]  studied password patterns as well. 
They analyze numbers and different date formats in 
passwords rather than replacement patterns. Wu[7]  
performed pattern analysis as well as cracking tests 
of a Kerberos realm containing over 25000 users. In 
their guessing attack, they could crack a total of 
2,045 passwords successfully by the end of a two-
week experiment. The half of the successfully 
guessed passwords was cracked by conducting 
dictionary attack. For the remaining half, they 
utilized some patterns like prefix, suffix, 
capitalization and reversing. 
 
Jakobsson and Dhiman[8]  proposed a new password 
model based on an analysis of the RockYou 
passwords. They scored passwords from five 
datasets of disclosed password datasets (i.e. Rootkit, 
Sony, PayPal, Justin Bieber fan web page and Porn 
web page datasets). Their analysis shows the 
average number of components per password in the 
different datasets. As a result, they found out that 
Justin Bieber dataset has the highest average 
number of word components compared with the 
other analyzed datasets. Replacement pattern is one 
of the components they utilized, but their 
replacement types belong to a very small set of 
characters. 
 
Wang et al.[9]  proposed a new password strength 
meter which can detect also certain patterns and 
evaluate password security accordingly. 
Houshmand and Aggarwal[10]  proposed a new 
system which analyzes whether a user proposed 
pass-word is weak or strong by estimating the 
probability of the password being cracked. They 
modify then the weak password to create a 
strengthened password as well. Some examples of 
the weak and strengthened password are trans2 
!%trans2, colton00 !8colton00. This system is also 
insecure against pattern-based dictionary attacks. 
An attacker can delve into the details of this system, 
identify specific patterns used by this system and 
use these identified patterns to generate possible 
strengthened passwords. 
 
Mazurek et al.[11]  performed an empirical study of 
plain-text passwords of 25 thousand faculty, staff, 
and students at a research university. They 
concluded that certain groups create more secure 
passwords than the others. For example, computer 
science students make passwords more than 1.8 
times as strong as the business school students. 
Comparing their contributions with our study, their 
focus is mainly based on the relation analysis of 
different categories like gender, college types, user 
types, etc. rather than password patterns. 
 
Kelley et al.[12]  studied the impact of different 
password policies on password complexity. They 
investigate mainly the resistance of passwords 
created under different policies and the performance 
of guessing algorithms under different training sets. 
Narayanan and Shmatikov[13]  showed how to reduce 
the size of password search space for dictionary 
attacks by using Markov modeling techniques. 
 
A new method was introduced by Matt Weir et al. 
[14]. They claimed that their method generates 
password structures in highest probability order. In 
light of a preparation set of previously disclosed 
passwords, they created a probabilistic context-free 
grammar in their method which can generate word-
mangling rules. Based on their paper, this method 
was able to crack 28% to 129% more password than 
John the Ripper. 
 
Cheng Yang, Jui-long Hung, and Zhangxi Lin[15]  
analyzed password patterns from a different 
perspective. Instead of general password patterns, 
they did their research on pass-word patterns of 
Chinese internet users. This research tried to 
understand how cultural factors effects molding 
password constructions. They reached some 
interesting results such as Chinese users have a 
weaker sense of security than Westerner users. The 
study of Hsien-Cheng Chou et al. [16]  stated that they 
developed a password analysis platform which can 
analyzes commonly used passwords and identifies 
frequently used pass-word patterns. These analyses 
helped them to create a model consisting of a 
Training set, a Dictionary set, and a Testing set 
(TDT model) to generate probabilistic passwords 
arranged in diminishing request. They claimed TDT 
model successfully cracked more passwords 1.43 
and 2.5 times higher than the John-the-Ripper 
attack and Brute-force attack. 
 
Briland Hitaj et al.[17]  involved deep learning 
approach for cracking password patterns for their 
research. Their machine learning technique 
(PassGAN) which can leverage Generative 
Adversarial Networks (GANs) to enhance password 
guessing. PassGAN represents a generous change in 
rule-based password generation tools since it 
induces password dissemination data self-rulingly 
from password information instead of by means of 
manual analysis. The paper compares their results 
with HashCat and underlines that PassGAN can 
match 18%-24% more passwords than HashCat 
alone. 
 
There have been some studies in the past to evaluate 
password patterns as explained in this section. But 
most of these studies focus only on a very limited 
set of patterns. On the contrary, we developed a 
Python program that performed an automated 
analysis to identify all replacement patterns which 
people choose to create their strong(!) passwords. 
The advantage of the automated analysis is that it 
finds out a complete list of possible replacement 
types rather than a small set that can be found by 
manual analyzes. 
 
III. OUR ANALYSIS 
 
A. Creating A Word List 
 
For this research, we used a plain text word list 
(1.330.780) from different languages including 
English, French, Spanish, Turkish, Italian, German, 
Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian which are the most 
common languages in the world that use Latin 
alphabets. All these dictionaries are available over 
the Internet. Table 1 illustrates the details about our 
word list. 
 
Language Number of Words 
English 270.099 
French 246.747 
Dutch 180.130 
Spanish 174.847 
German 166.103 
Turkish 119.575 
Italian 88.351 
Norwegian 61.413 
Danish 23.515 
Total 1.330.780 
Table 1 – Number of Worlds 
 
The main reason to choose English, German, 
Spanish, French, Turkish, Italian, Dutch, 
Norwegian, and Danish for this article was that they 
are the most widely spoken languages which use 
Latin alphabet[18]. 
 
As it can be seen on Table 1, its English dictionary 
contains 270K words. Its French dictionary contains 
240K words. Its Dutch dictionary contains 180K 
words. Its Spanish dictionary contains 174K words. 
Its German dictionary contains 166K words. Its 
Turkish dictionary contains 119K words. Its Italian 
dictionary contains 88K words. Its Norwegian 
dictionary contains 61K words. And finally, its 
Danish dictionary contains 23K words. 
 
B. Replacement Methodology 
After creating a plain text list then we applied three 
types of combinations for replacements. First we 
used single letter combination using Table 2, then 
we used dual letters combination using Table 3, 
finally we used triad letters combination using 
Table 4. For dual letters and triad letters 
combinations we chose the replacement from the 
Top 5 List of Replacement Types (Table 5). So 
these replacements were chosen based on the 
statistics that shows most replaced characters. 
 
Nr Replaced Replacing Examples 
1 a 0 str0nger, fl0ppy, 
2 a 1 sn1tch, chlppy 
3 a 4 dr4gon, br4ndon 
4 a 8 cre8tive, SK8TER 
5 a @ Dr@gon, the@ter 
6 b 3 num3ers 
7 b 6 ra66it 
8 b 8 bu88les, re8ecca 
9 d 0 to0dles, no0dle 
10 e 0 pr0view, cl0dle 
11 e 3 str@wb3rry 
12 e 5 mav5rick 
13 e 8 dayl8ss 
14 f 4 cali4ornia, the4ts 
15 g 6 ma66ie, ti66er 
16 g 9 ti99er 
17 h 1 petler, niclolas  
18 h 7 mo7amed 
19 i 1 pr1nc3ss, trlnlty 
20 i 7 pr7ncess 
21 i 8 sk8er, sk8ing 
22 i ! jess!ca, Prlnc3ss 
23 l 1 welc0me, app1es 
24 l 7 me7issa 
25 l ; che;sea ho;;ywood 
26 l ! vo!!ey 
27 m , ja,es 
28 o 0 pe0ple, vict0ria 
29 o 3 ch33se 
30 o @ passw@rd 
31 r . st.anger, st.oh 
32 s 1 pallword 
33 s 2 pa22word 
34 s 3 pa33word,  
35 s 4 pas4word 
36 s 5 ca55ie, mon5ter 
37 s 6 pa66word 
38 s 8 pa88word 
39 s $ je$$ica, Pa$$word 
40 t 7 Ma77hew 
41 t 8 la8ter 
42 v 7 Se7en 
43 z ? gon?alo 
Table 2 – Single Type Replacement 
 
 
Nr Replaced 
1 
Replacing 
1 
Replaced 
2 
Replacing 
2 
1 a @ o 0 
2 a @ i 1 
3 a @ l 1 
4 a @ e 3 
5 i 1 o 0 
6 i 1 e 3 
7 o 0 e 3 
8 o 0 l 1 
9 l 1 e 3 
Table 3 – Dual Type Replacement 
 
 
 
Nr Replaced 
1 
Replacing 
1 
Replaced 
2 
Replacing 
2 
Replaced 
3 
Replacing 
3 
1 a @ o 0 i 1 
2 a @ o 0 l 1 
3 a @ o 0 e 3 
4 a @ l 1 e 3 
5 a @ i 1 e 3 
6 i 1 o 0 e 3 
7 l 1 o 0 e 3 
8 s $ l ! o @ 
9 s $ i ! o @ 
10 s $ l ! a @ 
11 s $ i ! a @ 
12 b 6 g 9 l 1 
13 b 6 g 9 s 5 
14 g 9 l 1 s 5 
15 b 6 l 1 s 5 
Table 4 – Triad Type Replacement 
Nr Replaced Replacing Example 
1 i 1 mon1ka (monika), cook1es 
(cookies), fall1ng (falling) 
2 o 0 pe0ple (people), ver0nica 
(veronica), mem0ries 
(memories) 
3 e 3 hat3rs, spid3rman 
(spiderman), st3lla (stella) 
4 l 1 car1os (carlos), wa11ace 
(wallece) 
5 a @ tiff@ny (tiffany), sp@rky 
(sparky) 
Table 5 – Top 5 List of Replacement Types 
 
 
C. Recovering Hashed Passwords 
 
For recovering hashed passwords, hashcat was 
preffered for better performance and more accurate 
results. Just like creating a plain text database, to 
measure success rate we created a hashed 
passwords. The total number of hahshed passwords 
in this database is 1.411.217. The details of hashed 
passwords are in Table 6. Duplicated hashes were 
removed the database so after the elimination 
825.211 unique input remain. 
 
Name Number of Hashes 
dhool 15.301 
gamish 50.853 
sunrise 7.660 
ffgbeach 481.377 
OpNKorea 9.001 
bfield 548.686 
rootkit 71.228 
whitefox 47.238 
dsl 14.144 
opisrael 10.809 
mayhem 130.884 
casio 24.035 
Total 1.411.217 
Total (after removing 
duplicates) 
825.211 
Table 6 – Number of Hashes 
 
D. Results 
 
As mentioned before, we created dictionary inputs 
which consist of words from different languages. 
The total number of the word is 1.330.780. With 
this word list, we try to recover 825.211 unique 
MD5 hashes and 17.210 of them were successfully 
recovered. Then by applying our 3 different kind of 
pattern replacement to 1.330.780, we created 
33.171.129 words as a new input. This time, with 
this world list, we try to recover 825.211 unique 
MD5 hashes again and 30.215 of them were 
successfully recovered. As a result, with 
replacement patterns success rate of recovering 
hashed password considerably higher. When we 
compare both results, recovering passwords with 
patterns is almost 80 percent more higher then 
recovering them with just regular words. 
 
It is obvious from the results of our analysis that re-
placement patterns are commonly used by end-users 
and they jeopardize password security and 
authentication processes. The following mitigation 
methods can be suggested to enhance password 
security. 
 
Secure password managers (SPM) can be utilized to 
generate strong passwords without any pattern and 
store them securely by using encryption methods 
(e.g. AES-256). End-users need to create a strong 
master password to access their SPM database. 
Some SPMs support even smart-card authentication 
or/and two-factor authentication by checking the 
existence of a physical le that is generated randomly 
during the setup phase. 
 
Considering today’s risk scenarios, authentication 
based only on passwords is a very insecure method 
especially for critical applications like email, online 
banking, social networking, etc. Two-factor 
authentication should be activated and utilized 
especially for such critical applications. As 
examples, most online banking portals, Google 
Mail, Twitter, Wordpress etc. support already 
software tokens that are sent over SMS or generated 
by a native mobile application (e.g. Google 
Authenticator) for two-factor authentication. 
 
Awareness about patterns should be improved as 
well. Information security training organized 
especially for non-security experts can take patterns 
into consideration and ex-plain the risks of 
password patterns in detail. Black-listing of 
passwords can be extended by integrating patterns 
and not accepting pattern-based passwords by 
authentication systems. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
End-users need to choose complex passwords 
consisting of uppercase and lowercase letters, 
numbers, and symbols in order to prevent password 
guessing attacks. Since randomly-generated 
complex passwords are difficult to remember, they 
tend to create pattern-including passwords which 
contain numbers and symbols but are non-resistant 
to guessing at-tacks. In our research, we focused on 
a special type of such patterns namely Replacement 
Pattern. We identified possible replacement-types 
and try to recover passwords successfully. The 
identified replacement-types can be used to improve 
guessing attacks, especially for forensic 
investigations. Secure pass-word managers and 
two-factor authentication are suggested to minimize 
the risks of replacement patterns. 
 
As future work, we plan to improve automated 
analyzes of other patterns like Inserting, Repeating, 
Sequencing and Capitalizing can be performed. 
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